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The paper proposes that care for the natural environment be treated 
as a prima facie duty in order to resolve the conflict between the 
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric frameworks in 
environmental ethics. In light of William David Ross’ conditional 
deontology, prima facie duty is a conditional duty whose actuality is 
determined by what is properly demanded in a conflict situation. 
While Ross conceptualized such duty for the benefit of humans as 
sources and recipients of moral actions, the same duty can be 
extended to the natural environment as a “moral subject.” On the one 
hand, the anthropocentric framework posits that the environment has 
instrumental valuable; thus, humans have the duty to care for it 
because it is instrumental for their flourishing. On the other hand, the 
non-anthropocentric framework posits that the environment has an 
inherent valuable; thus, humans have the duty to care for it because it 
is valuable in its own right.  I argue that treating care for the natural 
environment as a prima facie duty remedies the conflict between 
these opposing frameworks. The conditional status of the said duty is 
a means to determine and thereby prioritize the more incumbent duty 
in concrete conflict situations between the opposing frameworks.   
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The decade of 1970s saw the development of environmental 
philosophy propelled by the emergence of environmental crisis. This 
crisis — that began unobtrusively since the industrial revolution — is 
essentially caused by human beings’ insatiable hunger for 
development, their ever-increasing dependence on technology for 
productivity, global economic expansions, and rapid population 
growth. These excesses were profoundly articulated by the two 
equally important works on environmental degradation in the 1960s: 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring published in 1962 and Paul Ehrlich’s The 
Population Bomb published in 1968.1 J. Baird Callicott and Robert 
Frodeman claim that “[t]he manhandling of nature turned the 
attention of a small group of philosophers to questions concerning 
human obligations to (or for) nature—that is, to environmental 
ethics.”2 
The philosophers’ unceasing investigation of the crisis gave 
birth to environmental ethics. “[E]nvironmental ethics,” writes Joseph 
R. Desjardins, “is a systematic account of the moral relations between 
human beings and their natural environment. Environmental ethics 
assumes that ethical norms can and do govern human behavior 
toward the natural world.”3 Presumed in Desjardins’ definition is that 
the natural environment itself is a non-human moral person and 
therefore has moral status. F. J. Evangelista and N. Mabaquiao Jr. claim 
that “[n]on-human moral persons…refer to those possessing the 
defining features of being a moral person but not of being a human 
being.”4 By this, they mean that “non-human moral persons” may 
include “animals, aliens, [the environment] and artificial entities like 
corporations and intelligent machines.”5 In relation to human agency, 
the environment is a moral subject or moral patient, that is, it acts as a 
recipient of “morally evaluable actions” of human moral persons.6 
                                                 
1 Alasdair Cochrane, “Environmental Ethics,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy; available from https://iep.utm.edu/envi-eth/; accessed 04 September 
2020.    
2 J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Environmental 
Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 1 (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2009), xv. 
3 Joseph R. Desjardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental 
Philosophy, 5th Edition (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2013), 17.    
4 Francis Julius N. Evangelista and Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics: Theories 
and Applications (Mandaluyong City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2020), 24.    
5 Ibid., additions are mine.   
6 Ibid.  
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Like the other branches of applied ethics, environmental ethics 
is enlivened by the tension among its different frameworks. While it is 
unquestionably clear today that care for the environment is human 
beings’ moral duty, the anthropocentric and the non-anthropocentric 
frameworks completely oppose each other as regards the motivation 
of performing such duty. The former’s motivation for care is driven by 
its instrumental understanding of the value of the natural 
environment; while the latter is driven by its inherent value.  
By instrumental understanding of the value of the natural 
environment, I mean to say that the environment is taken care of 
because it is treated as a means to an end. An example of which is the 
taking care of the trees up the mountains (means) in view of cutting 
them down to be made lumbers for structural purposes (end). By 
recognizing the inherent value of the natural environment, I mean to 
say that the environment is taken care of because it is good in itself. An 
example of which is the preservation of rain forests for the 
maintenance of earth’s water cycle and biodiversity.  
To remedy this polarity, I propose that care for the environment 
has to be treated as a prima facie duty. Following Ross’ conditional 
deontology, conflict situations between the two frameworks can be 
solved once the more incumbent duty is identified in concrete 
circumstances. I accordingly divide the discussion into three parts: the 
first part deals with Ross’ concept of prima facie duty; the second 
deals with the contentions of the two opposing frameworks and the 
conflict situations in which the frameworks are involved; the third 
part deals with the application of care for the environment as a prima 
facie duty in the said conflict situations.      
 
I. William David Ross’ Concept of Prima Facie Duty 
 
Ross’ Critique of I. Kant’s Deontology and G. E. Moore’s Ideal 
Utilitarianism  
 
Ross recognizes the two important ethical theories “that offer a 
solution of such cases of conscience”:  one is Kant’s deontology; the 
other is G. E. Moore’s ideal utilitarianism.7 While he recognizes the 
importance of these two ethical systems, Ross notes that these 
systems are problematic. Kant’s categorical imperative and Moore’s 
ideal utilitarianism must “fit the facts” in order to solve cases of 
                                                 
7 William David Ross, The Right and The Good, Philip Stratton-Lake, ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 18-19.  
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conscience. The following paragraphs will now show what Ross means 
by saying the ethical theories must fit the facts.8      
As regards Kant’s deontology, his main objection is its abstract 
and absolutist character. Ross claims that 
 
The whole method of abstraction, if relied upon, when used 
alone, to answer the question ‘What ought I to do?’, is a 
mistake. For the acts we have to choose between, say the 
telling of the truth or the saying of what is untrue, in some 
particular circumstances, or the keeping or the breaking of a 
promise, are completely individual acts, and their rightness 
or their wrongness will spring from their whole nature, and 
no element in their nature can safely be abstracted from. To 
abstract is to shut our eyes to the detail of the moral 
situation and to deprive ourselves of the data for a true 
judgment about it. . . . The only safe way of applying Kant’s 
test of universalizability is to envisage the act in its whole 
concrete particularity, and then ask ‘Could I wish that 
everyone, when in exactly similar circumstances, should tell 
a lie exactly similar to that which I am thinking of telling?’ 
But then universalizability, as a short cut to knowing what is 
right, has failed us. For it is just as hard to see whether a 
similar act by someone else, with all its concrete 
particularity, would be right, as it is to see whether our own 
proposed act would be right.9 
 
Ross points out that Kant’s universal and absolute categorical 
imperative—represented by the question “What ought I to do?”—that 
is duty which “is objectively necessary, without regard to any end”10— 
is essentially impractical in dealing with “completely individual acts.” 
He furthers that the moral quality of these acts “spring from their 
whole nature” that can never be abstracted from. For him, abstraction 
is to ignore the concreteness of moral situation and to let go of the 
chance to make a true judgment about it. Thus, Ross contends that 
“our duty is to do certain things, not to do them from the sense of 
                                                 
8 See ibid., 19.   
9 William David Ross, Kant’s Ethical Theory: A Commentary on the grundlegung 
zur metaphysik der sitten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 33-34.   
10 Bertrand Russell, The History of Western Philosophy (New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 1972), 710.    
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duty.”11 Meaning, the moral duty of the person in a concrete moral 
situation is to do things according to the demands of the said situation, 
not to think about a priori duty that would serve as a moral compass 
in doing what is right in the same situation. Although he heavily 
criticized Kant’s categorical imperative, he nonetheless recognized it is 
a “necessary part of the true method.”  
As regards Moore’s ideal utilitarianism, Ross has three main 
objections against it: 1) its reduction of “morally significant 
relations,”12 2) its “ignorance of the highly personal character of 
duty,”13 and 3) the connection between what is optimific and right— 
“any act that is optimific is right and any act that is right is 
optimific”14— is not self-evident.15  
Regarding objection 1, Ross writes:  
 
[Utilitarianism] says, in effect, that the only morally 
significant relation in which my neighbors stand to me is 
that of being possible beneficiaries of my action. They do 
stand in this relation to me, and this relation is morally 
significant. But they may also stand to me in the relation of 
promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to 
husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow 
countryman to fellow countryman, and the like; and each of 
these relationships is the foundation of a prima facie duty, 
which is more or less incumbent upon me according to the 
circumstances of the case.16 
 
Ross points out that utilitarianism simplifies and thereby 
reduces one’s “morally significant relation” with the other. While 
treating others as “possible beneficiaries of my action” is significant, 
such theoretical designation overlooks one’s concrete relation to the 
other as “promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to 
husband, of child to parent” and the like. Utilitarianism’s simplification 
and reduction of one’s morally significant relations with the other 
dissolves the uniqueness of different relationships that is “the 
foundation of a prima facie duty.” Ignoring these grades of 
                                                 
11 Ross, The Right and The Good, 6.  
12 Ibid., 19.  
13 Ibid., 22.  
14 Ibid., 34.  
15 Ibid., 36.  
16 Ibid., 19.   
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relationships ambiguates the incumbency of a certain duty relevant to 
a particular circumstance, especially in times of conflict situation. 
Regarding objection 2, Ross writes:  
 
The essential defect of the ‘ideal utilitarian’ theory is that it 
ignores, or at least does not do full justice to, the highly 
personal character of duty. If the only duty is to produce the 
maximum of good, the question of who is to have the good – 
whether it is myself, or my benefactor, or a person to whom 
I have made a promise to confer that good on him, or a mere 
fellow man to whom I stand in no such special relationship – 
should make no difference to my having a duty to produce 
that good. But we are all in fact sure that it makes a vast 
difference.17  
 
Ross points out that utilitarianism disregards the “highly 
personal character of duty.” If the only duty “is to produce the 
maximum good,” the unique personality of the agent and the recipient 
of the action disappears into the foliage of aspiring to produce such 
good. Ross insists that such proclivity makes every moral action too 
abstract and general. For him, the highly personal character of duty 
“makes a vast difference.” 
Regarding objection 3, referring to Moore’s view that that the 
“coextensiveness of ‘right’ and ‘optimific’ is apprehended 
immediately”—and thus, Moore “rejects the possibility of any proof of 
it”—Ross writes:  
 
It might seem absurd to suggest that it could be right for any 
one to do an act which would produce consequences less 
good than those which would be produced by some other 
act in his power. Yet a little thought will convince us that 
this is not absurd. The type of case in which it is easiest to 
see that this is so is, perhaps, that in which one has made a 
promise. In such a case we all think that prima facie it is our 
duty to fulfil the promise irrespective of the precise 
goodness of the total consequences. And though we do not 
think it is necessarily our actual or absolute duty to do so, 
we are far from thinking that any, even the slightest, gain in 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 22.  
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the value of the total consequences will necessarily justify 
us in doing some- thing else instead.18 
 
Ross argues that the optimality of the consequence of the act is 
not an absolute criterion for its rightness. In order to prove this, he 
examines the act of fulfilling a promise. He notes that it is “our duty to 
fulfil the promise irrespective of the precise goodness of the total 
consequences.” Whether fulfilling it is an actual duty or not, what 
essentially matters is that it is our duty to fulfill the promise. Ross 
further argues that “[a]fter all, a promise is a promise, and is not to be 
treated so lightly as the theory we are examining would imply [ideal 
utilitarianism]. What, exactly, a promise is, is not so easy to determine, 
but we are surely agreed that it constitutes a serious moral limitation 
to our freedom of action.”19 
After pointing out the theoretical and practical flaws of the 
ethical systems of Kant [the impracticality of the universal and 
absolutist categorical imperative in dealing with “completely 
individual acts”] and Moore [the reduction of “morally significant 
relations,” its “ignorance of the highly personal character of duty,” and 
the not self-evident connection between what is optimific and right], 
Ross proposes the theory of prima facie duties. Evangelista and 
Mabaquiao Jr. write that “[t]his ethical theory belongs to the 
deontological kind because it maintains the idea that what primarily 
determines the morality of the actions is the performance of the moral 
duties.”20 However, unlike Kant’s deontology, Ross’ deontology is 
conditional because it accepts exceptions. These exceptions “may 
sometimes be a result of considering the consequences of an action 
(thereby accommodating utilitarian considerations) or some other 
morally relevant factors.”21 
 
Prima Facie Duty 
 
Ross defines prima facie duty as “a brief way of referring to the 
characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which 
an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g., the keeping of a 
promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not 
at the same time of another kind which is morally significant. Whether 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 34.  
19 Ibid., 35.  
20 Evangelista and Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics, 83.   
21 Ibid.  
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an act is a duty proper or actual duty depends on all the morally 
significant kinds it is an instance of.”22 The term “prima facie duty,” 
Ross clarifies, is not an actual duty but “something related in a special 
way to duty.”23  Furthermore, he insists that the term “prima facie” 
pertains to “an objective fact involved in the nature of the situation, or 
more strictly in an element of its nature, though not, as duty proper 
does, arising from its whole nature.” A prima facie duty “rests on a 
definite circumstance which cannot seriously be held to be without 
moral significance.”24 
Ross’ definition of prima facie duty as a “way of referring to the 
characteristic of a certain kind of act” means that it is not an actual 
duty but a conditional duty. It is conditional because the actuality of its 
performance depends on the “nature of the situation.” The prima facie 
duty that “we have recognized in a given situation is not necessarily 
the action that we should actually do in that situation. Our prima facie 
duty is merely our tentative duty…”25 In fact, conditional duty is 
“something related to [an actual] duty” in the sense that it serves as a 
guide to doing what is demanded by a “definite circumstance.”  
Presumed in Ross’ understanding of prima facie duty is that it is 
self-evident. It is self-evident “in the sense that when we have reached 
sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to the 
proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence 
beyond itself.”26 Thus, by intuition—aided by “sufficient mental 
maturity”—we know what our prima facie duty is in concrete 
situations. By intuition, we know very well that it is our prima facie 
duty to make up for our wrongful acts. Presuming that this prima facie 
duty is what is demanded by the specific context we find ourselves in, 
then this prima facie duty for reparation becomes our actual duty. 
However, when prima facie duties are in conflict with each 
other, Ross writes: 
 
When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in which 
more than one of these prima facie duties is incumbent on 
me, what I have to do is to study the situation as fully as I 
can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) 
that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent 
                                                 
22 Ross, The Right and the Good, 19-20.  
23 Ibid., 20.  
24 Ibid.   
25 Evangelista and Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics, 85-86.   
26  Ross, The Right and the Good, 29. 
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than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this 
prima facie duty is my duty…in the situation.27 
 
Here, Ross indicates that when there are conflicting prima facie 
duties, the first thing to do is to study the situation fully. After which, 
one can now determine that “one of them is more incumbent than any 
other.” That which is more incumbent is the actual duty. Suppose that 
one promised to buy his/her son an expensive toy [prima facie duty X: 
duty to fulfill the promise made]. Now, after making such promise, 
he/she realized that his/her money would no longer be enough to buy 
it because he/she still had to pay for his/her son’s tuition fee [prima 
facie duty Y: duty to pay the tuition fee]. Clearly, prima facie duty Y 
overrides prima facie duty X; the former becomes the actual duty. 
However, Ross clarifies that just because X is the less incumbent duty 
does not mean it ceases to be a prima facie duty. X becomes 
conditional because that is not demanded by the concrete situation 
above.28 At some point, prima facie duty X may override prima facie 
duty Y provided that there would be enough money to buy the same 
expensive toy.    
Ross’s concept of prima facie duty should not be confused with 
situation/situational ethics developed by the American Anglican 
theologian Joseph F. Fletcher although both of them underscore the 
importance of a particular circumstance as a determining factor for 
the morality of an act.  They differ on two grounds: first, Fletcher’s 
situation ethics presupposes the existence of God which is “alien” in 
Ross’ system; second, his situation ethics makes “love” as the only 
determinizing factor for the morality of an act while Ross recognizes 
both the importance of the performance of duty and the possible 
exceptions for the performance of which in concrete conflict 
situations. 
In his attempt to synthesize legalism and what he calls 
“unprincipled” antinomianism, Fletcher advances situation ethics. This 
system proposes that one “enters into every decision-making situation 
fully armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, 
and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just 
the same he is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set 
them aside in the situation if love seems better served by doing so.”29 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 19.  
28 See Evangelista and Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics, 85.  
29 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1966), 26.   
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Unlike Ross, Fletcher recognizes the importance of the “ethical 
maxims”—commands and rules—only as “illuminators.” This means 
that laws or precepts only occupy a “subservient place” in the 
performance of a moral action “so that only love and reason really 
count when the chips are down!”30 Situationist ethics “follows a moral 
law or violates it according to love's need.”31 Here “love” should be 
understood in the context of the command “to love God in the 
neighbor.”32 This contention presupposes the existence of God and His 
role as the lawgiver in decision making which could not be found in 
Ross’ ethical system. Furthermore, “only the commandment to love is 
categorically good.”33 “Reason” should be understood here as “the 
instrument of moral judgment, while rejecting the notion that the 
good is ‘given’ in the nature of things, objectively.”34     
    
II. The Conflict Between the Anthropocentric and Non-
Anthropocentric Frameworks 
 
The Anthropocentric Framework 
 
J. Desjardins claims that “[t]he Western philosophical tradition 
denies that any direct moral relationship exists between humans and 
the natural environment.”35 Such denial roots from the assumption of 
its theories that only humans have moral standing because of their 
rationality—rationality is the only basis for moral standing. Since only 
humans are rational, then only humans have moral standing. As a 
corollary, care for the natural environment is a duty only because it is 
a means for human flourishing. This instrumental approach is justified 
by no less than Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle claims that 
“[n]ature has made all things specifically for the sake of man.”36 In his 
refutation against those who claim that “it is a sin for man to kill brute 
animals,” Thomas Aquinas argues that “animals are ordered to man’s 
use in the natural course of things, according to divine providence. 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 31.  
31 Ibid., 26.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.   
35  Desjardins, Environmental Ethics, 98. 
36 Aristotle, Politics, E. Barker, tr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), Bk. 
1, Ch. 8. 
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Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing 
them or employing them in any other way.”37  
Mike W. Martin enumerates the “purely” instrumental values of 
the natural environment presumed by the anthropocentric 
framework: economic, aesthetic, recreational, scientific, and for 
human survival. The economic instrumental value pertains to the 
“management and conservation of resources essential for a productive 
economy.”38 The aesthetic instrumental value refers to “the enjoyment 
of natural beauty and sublime vistas, waterfalls, and mountain 
ranges.” The recreational instrumental value refers to the use and 
abuse of the environment for human recreational purposes. The 
scientific instrumental value refers to “the on-going study of the 
‘natural laboratories’ of wilderness areas.” The instrumental value for 
the sake of human survival refers to the environmental conservation 
and preservation for the good of humanity.  
By and large, all these instrumental values indicate that human 
beings’ care for the environment is indirect. This means that 
“[e]nvironmental responsibility is, at bottom, a matter of prudence: 
We protect the environment for our own interests.”39 This 
anthropocentrically self-serving duty emanates from the presumption 
that rationality bestows one moral standing. Rationality-based 
bestowal of moral status is what justifies the reduction of the natural 
environment as a means to an end. 
   
The Non-Anthropocentric Framework 
 
Proponents of the non-anthropocentric framework argue that 
the natural environment has an inherent or intrinsic value. “To say 
that an object is intrinsically valuable is to say that it has a good of its 
own and that what is good for it does not depend on outside factors.”40 
This means that the environment’s value is not bestowed by humans 
because it is instrumental for them but because the environment’s 
value is “found or recognized [in them] rather than given.”  Therefore, 
humans, have the duty to care for the environment because it is 
inherently good. Implied in this statement is the recognition that the 
                                                 
37 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, English Dominican Friars, eds. 
(London: Burns and Oates, 1924), Bk. 4, Pt. 4, Pt. 2.  
38 Mike W. Martin, Everyday Morality: An Introduction to Applied Ethics, 2nd  
Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995), 345.  
39 Desjardins, Environmental Ethics, 98.   
40 Ibid., 131. 
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natural environment has a moral standing—that it is a moral subject. 
Paul W. Taylor defines moral subject as “any being that can be treated 
rightly or wrongly and toward whom moral agents can have duties 
and responsibilities.”41 This definition categorizes natural 
environment as a moral subject on the basis of its inherent value.  
 Under the non-anthropocentric framework, three theories are 
popularly known: sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. While 
they differ in scope as regards the recipients of the actions of moral 
agents, they nonetheless operate on the same proposition that non-
human beings have moral standing because they are inherently 
valuable. This inherent value demands that humans must have the 
duty to care for them as they are. While non-humans can never be 
moral agents, their status as moral subjects should be “judged to be 
equally deserving of moral concern and consideration.”42     
First, unlike most of the western ethical frameworks, 
sentientism “grounds moral status not on an individual’s rationality, 
but on the individual’s sentience.”43 Peter Singer, one of the prominent 
advocates of sentientism, argues that what bestows moral standing to 
an individual is not one’s rationality but one’s sentiency: the capacity 
to feel pain and pleasure. This criterion for moral standing, while 
necessarily includes humans, clearly shows that animals have moral 
standing because they can feel pain or pleasure. Singer argues that 
“[a]nimals can feel pain…[T]here can be no moral justification for 
regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals feel as less important 
than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans.”44 Second, 
biocentrism expands moral standing not only to animals but also to 
life itself. “Philosophers supporting biocentrism would grant 
membership in the moral community not on the basis of being rational 
or being sentient, but rather on the basis of being alive.”45 Thus, every 
being that has life has a moral standing. Third, closely related to 
biocentrism is ecocentrism. Expanding the scope of biocentrism, 
ecocentrism “recognizes intrinsic value in all life forms and 
ecosystems themselves, including their abiotic components.”46 
 
                                                 
41 Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, 25th 
Anniversary Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 17.  
42 Ibid., 46.  
43 Evangelista and Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics, 201. 
44 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, Revised Edition (New York, NY: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 15. 
45 Evangelista and Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics, 203.   
46 Ibid.  
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The Conflict Situations between the Two Frameworks 
 
While the anthropocentric framework “bestows” instrumental 
value in the natural environment, the non-anthropocentric framework 
“recognizes” its inherent value. This epistemic and axiological 
differences determine the kind of motivation that propels humans’ 
duty to care for the natural environment. On the one hand, the 
anthropocentric framework propounds that humans have the duty to 
care for the natural environment because it is instrumental for their 
flourishing. On the other hand, the non-anthropocentric framework 
propounds that humans have the duty to care for the natural 
environment because it is inherently valuable. This difference in 
motivation is the source of conflict between the two frameworks. The 
following three conflict situations correspond to the objections raised 
by sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism against the 
anthropocentric framework. Conflict situations in interrogative form 
enumerated in each section will later be analyzed and resolved in part 
III using Ross’ prima facie duty.    
 
 a. The Conflict between Sentientism and the Anthropocentric 
Framework 
The use of animals for scientific research, for food and for 
leisure is a very contentious topic in environmental ethics. The 
anthropocentric framework’s insistence that animals only have 
instrumental value justifies its reduction of them as a means to an end, 
that is, human flourishing. However, Singer argues that such reduction 
of animals is driven by speciesism— “a prejudice or attitude of bias in 
favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against 
those of members of other species.”47 He pointed out that in order to 
overcome this prejudice, rationality—the distinguishing mark of the 
human species—must not be seen as the criterion that bestows moral 
standing. Following Jeremy Bentham, Singer notes that it is the 
capacity to feel pain and pleasure that bestows moral standing. “[T]he 
principle of equality requires that its [animals’] suffering be counted 
equally with the like suffering-insofar as rough comparisons can be 
made-of any other being.”48 Following Bentham’s utilitarian ethics, 
“we ought to maximize pleasure and pain, and since animals are 
                                                 
47 Singer, Animal Liberation, 6.   
48 Ibid., 8.  
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capable of feeling pleasure and pain as humans, we should give weight 
to animals’ experience in our calculation of right and wrong.”49  
Now, having considered Singer’s view, an advocate of the 
anthropocentric framework may ask the following questions: [1] The 
use of animals for scientific research in order to develop drugs and 
medical procedures to treat diseases has been beneficial for both 
humans and animals. Since it is unethical to use humans for scientific 
research, must not science use them because the methods may be too 
painful or harmful and even deadly for them? [2] Is it morally wrong 
to hunt animals for leisure?    
 
b. The Conflict between Biocentrism and the Anthropocentric 
Framework 
 
For Taylor, these core beliefs summarize the biocentric outlook: 
1) humans and other living things “are members of Earth’s community 
of life”50; 2) all living species are “integral elements in a system of 
interdependence”51; 3) “all organisms are teleological centers of life in 
the sense that each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its 
own way”52; and 4) “humans are not inherently superior to other 
living things.”53  For him, moral agents who are rational, can accept 
this biocentric outlook. The concrete manifestation of such acceptance 
is respect. By respect, Taylor means “attitude of respect for nature.” If 
all living things are seen as having value in themselves, “we might not 
take a purely exploitative attitude toward them, since we might still 
grant that they have some degree of inherent worth and so are not to 
be used in any way humans wish.”54 From this outlook, it is unethical 
to treat a living thing as a means to an end.  
Now, having considered Taylor’s view, an advocate of the 
anthropocentric framework may ask the question: [3] Does killing 
cockroaches mean that we have a “purely exploitative attitude toward 
them”? [4] Is it “purely exploitative” to kill an animal to protect one’s 
property?    
 
                                                 
49 Evangelista and Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics, 202. 
50 Taylor, Respect for Nature, 99.  
51 Ibid., 100.   
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid., 133.  
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c. The Conflict between Ecocentrism and the Anthropocentric 
Framework 
 
 Expanding the aforesaid theories, ecocentric outlook recognizes 
the inherent value not only of humans and other living organisms but 
also ecosystems themselves and their non-living elements. From this 
perspective, not only living things have moral standing but also land, 
oceans, mountains and the like. Aldo Leopold, an ecologist, exemplifies 
such expansion: 
 
The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the 
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals […] 
A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, 
management, and use of these ‘resources,’ but it does affirm 
their right to continued existence, and, at least in spots, their 
continued existence in a natural state.55  
 
  Enlargement or expansion of the “boundaries of community” 
include the abiotic components. While Leopold recognizes that we 
cannot stop the use and abuse of these resources, the “land ethic” 
affirm their right to exist… “in a natural state.” By using the word “land 
ethic,” Leopold implies that the whole ecosystem has a moral standing. 
“[A] land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the 
land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect 
for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.”56 
The imperative “to respect” the ecosystem as such shows that humans’ 
relationship with the community of biotic and abiotic things must be 
based on the recognition of their inherent value. Without which, 
abuse, alteration, and degradation of nature as whole would still 
persist.  
 Now, having considered Leopold’s view, an advocate of the 
anthropocentric framework may ask these questions: [5] Is 
government-approved mining morally wrong? [6] Is it a gross 
disrespect to natural environment when it is converted into something 
commercially useful?   
 
 
                                                 
55 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1949), 203-204.    
56 Ibid., 204.  
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III. The Application of Care for the Environment as a Prima Facie 
Duty 
 
 Now that the opposing frameworks and their conflicts have 
already been laid down, I will now analyze the six questions raised 
above using Ross’ concept prima facie duty. It has been emphasized by 
Ross that in order to determine which prima facie duty is more 
incumbent—the actual duty— than the other, the performance of duty 
totally immersed in the concreteness of the situation: 1) must be 
concrete and specific [against Kant’s absolute and abstract 
deontology] and 2) must be attentive to the morally significant 
relations and to the highly personal character of duty [against Moore’s 
ideal utilitarianism]. In order to properly contextualize Ross’ prima 
facie duty as regards humans’ relationship with the natural 
environment, this work assumes that the natural environment is a 
non-human moral person and therefore has a status as a moral subject 
or patient.57 To make the questions made above more realistic 
according to Ross’ general requirements of concreteness and 
significance of relations, I will now rephrase the questions according 
to the context of the following six conflict situations.  
 
Concrete Conflict Situation between Sentientism and 
Anthropocentrism 
 
 Situation 1: “In 2015 the Ebola vaccine VSV-EBOV was proven 
to be 100% safe in 7,500 people. The vaccine, which was initially 
tested safe and effective in primates, subsequently showed extremely 
promising results in humans.”58  
Contextualized question 1: Since it is unethical to use humans 
for scientific research, must not scientists in testing the efficacy of 
VSV-EBOV vaccine use the primates because the methods may be too 
painful or harmful and even deadly for them?  
Solution 1: Two conflicting prima facie duties are involved here: 
first, the duty to protect and preserve human life [anthropocentric 
duty] and second, the duty not to harm the primates [sentientic duty]. 
Based on the given situation, the more incumbent duty is the duty to 
                                                 
57 See Evangelista and Mabaquiao, Jr., Ethics, 20-30.   
58 Understanding Animal Research, Why are animals used in scientific 
research?; available from 
https://www.understandinganimalresearch.org.uk/files/2114/6425/; accessed 12 
September 2020. 
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protect and preserve human life. The duty not to harm the primates 
still remains a prima facie duty and it may become an actual duty in a 
completely different situation for example, hunting primates for 
recreational purposes.  
Situation 2: “Even today, acquiring trophy animals is a way of 
displaying power, Kalof noted. In some African countries, where big-
game hunting and trophy display are expensive forms of 
entertainment practiced predominantly by white men, hunting recalls 
ideologies that are deeply rooted in colonialism and patriarchy, Kalof 
said.”59  
Contextualized question 2: Must not the white men acquire 
trophy animals by hunting in some African countries to “display 
power” and entertainment?  
Solution 2: Two conflicting prima facie duties come to the fore: 
the duty to care for the animals [sentientic duty] and the duty [right] 
to pleasure [anthropocentric duty]. Based on the given situation, the 
more incumbent duty is the duty to care for the animals. There are too 
many ways to display power and find leisure. For example, in order to 
relieve stress, one may paint an image of an animal or participate in a 
paintball game.      
 
Concrete Conflict Situation between Biocentrism and 
Anthropocentrism 
 
Situation 3: “[C]ockroaches trapped from the toilets of houses 
with pit latrines had mean microbial counts of 12.3 ×1010 bacteria/ml 
and 98 parasites/ml, with the microorganisms representing a wide 
range of faecal-oral pathogens…[Cockroaches] can, therefore, enhance 
the faecal-oral transmission of pathogens by providing additional 
pathways from excreta to food and/or kitchen utensils.”60 
Contextualized question 3: Does killing cockroaches mean that 
we have a “purely exploitative attitude toward them” provided that 
they can “enhance the faecal-oral transmission of pathogens by 
providing additional pathways from excreta to food and/or kitchen 
utensils”?  
                                                 
59 Mindy Weisberger, Hunting big game: Why people kill animals for fun, in 
LiveScience; available from from https://www.livescience.com/59229-why-hunt-for-
sport.html; accessed 12 September 2020. 
60 World Health Organization, Guidelines on Sanitation and Health; available 
from https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/274939/9789241514705-
eng.pdf?ua=1; accessed 12 September 2020. 
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Solution 3: Two conflicting prima facie duties are involved here: 
first, the duty to protect and preserve human life [anthropocentric 
duty] and second, the duty not to kill or exploit the said insects 
[biocentric duty]. Based on the given situation, the more incumbent 
duty is the duty to protect and preserve human life. The duty not to 
kill or exploit the cockroaches still remains a prima facie duty and it 
may become an actual duty in a completely different situation; for 
example, killing them for the sake of killing them.  
Situation 4: “Many states [in the US] also have laws that make it 
legal for farmers or others to kill dogs that are chasing, harassing, or 
injuring their livestock or domestic animals—which may or may not 
include pets.”61  
Contextualized question 4: Is it “purely exploitative” for some 
states in the US to legalize killing dogs “that are chasing, harassing, or 
injuring their livestock or domestic animals?”   
Solution 4: There are two conflicting prima facie duties in the 
situation: the duty to protect one’s property, that is, one’s livestock or 
domestic animals [anthropocentric duty] and the duty not to harm or 
kill dogs [biocentric duty]. The more incumbent duty here is the duty 
not to harm or kill dogs. There are many ways to protect one’s 
livestock from stray or trespassing dogs: build walls around the 
poultry/farm, regular patrolling of one’s property and the like.     
 
Concrete Conflict Situation between Ecocentrism and 
Anthropocentrism 
 
 Situation 5: “Last month, a government panel cleared 23 of 
those mines for complying with state regulations. There are 50 
operating mines in the Philippines, 30 of which extract nickel ore 
which is mostly shipped to China. But the industry contributes less 
than 1 percent to the gross domestic product with only 3 percent of 9 
million hectares identified by the state as having high mineral 
reserves.”62 
Contextualized question 5: Are the 23 government-approved 
mining corporations morally right in extracting nickel—that is 
                                                 
61 E.A Gjelten, When it’s legal to kill a dog, in Nolo available from  
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/dog-book/chapter9-2.html; 
accessed 12 September 2020.  
62 Manolo Serapio Jr., Philippines’ Duterte says to end mining ‘one of these 
days,’ in Reuters; available from  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-
mining/philippines-duterte-says-to-end-mining-one-of-these-days-idUSKBN1JS1BX; 
accessed 12 September 2020.  
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environmentally destructive— for profit that “contributes less than 1 
percent to gross domestic product with only 3 percent of 9 million 
hectares identified by the state as having high mineral reserves”?  
Solution 5: Four conflicting prima facie duties are involved here: 
first, the duty to protect human life from the catastrophic effects of 
mining [anthropocentric duty, ecocentric duty]; second, the duty to 
care for the natural environment because it is inherently valuable 
[ecocentric duty]; third, the government’s duty to provide jobs for its 
citizens [anthropocentric duty]; and fourth, the duty of individuals to 
make a living for them and for their family [anthropocentric duty]. 
Based on the given situation, the more incumbent duty is the duty to 
care for the natural environment because it is inherently valuable. 
Fulfilling this duty also means that human lives will be protected from 
the catastrophic effects of nickel mining. The government’s duty to 
provide jobs for its citizens and the duty of individuals to make a living 
for them and for their family still remain a prima facie duty and can be 
actualized in different circumstances. For example, these duties may 
become actual in the context of teaching, managing, care services and 
other jobs that are not environmentally destructive.  
Situation 6: “It is…undeniable that Senator Cynthia and her 
husband, former Senator Manny Villar, are the owners of the Vista 
Land & Lifescapes, one of the biggest land developers in the country. 
Vista Land, including its arms Camella Homes and Lumina Homes, has 
turned vast farm lands across the country into sprawling subdivisions 
and huge malls.”63  
Contextualized question 6: Are the Villars grossly disrespecting 
the vast farm lands across the country when they are converting them 
into “sprawling subdivisions and huge malls”? 
Solution 6: While there are more than two conflicting prima 
facie duties in the given situation, I will only focus on the following: 
the duty to care for the vast farm lands (ecocentric duty) and the duty 
to help others [job opportunities provided by Vista Land & Lifescapes, 
sprawling subdivision and huge malls mean profit for the place and its 
people] (anthropocentric duty). Here, the more incumbent prima facie 
duty is the duty to care for the vast farmlands. Corollary to fulfilling 
this duty is the welfare of the people living or owning the same farm 
lands. Furthermore, cultivating these farmlands well increases the 
                                                 
63 Kaisahan, Conflict of interest with Villar committee leadership?, in Kaisahan: 
Solidarity towards agrarian reform and rural development; available from 
https://kaisahan.com.ph/posts/conflict-interest-villar-committee-leadership; 
accessed 12 September 2020.  
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people’s profits. Fulfilling the said ecocentric duty means hitting three 
birds in one shot.          
 
Conclusion   
 
 In light of Ross’ ethical theory of prima facie duty—a 
conditional duty whose actuality is determined by what is properly 
demanded by a situation and/or conflict situation—the concrete 
conflicting duties between the anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric frameworks have already been resolved operating 
under the assumption that the natural environment is a moral subject. 
Although the tension between the two frameworks are still far from 
over since their completely opposite understanding of the value of 
natural environment will never change, the actual duties have 
nonetheless been identified in the six conflict situations. While the six 
conflict situations do not exhaust all the possible conflicts between the 
two frameworks, Ross’ concept of prima facie duty is a practical tool in 
identifying humans’ actual duty to the natural environment. Equipped 
with the Rossian ethical framework, humans—regardless of the 
frameworks they espouse—can now commit themselves more to one 
of the timeliest imperatives in human history: to take care of the 
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